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Abstract – The management and combination of uncertain, imprecise, fuzzy and even paradoxical or high conflicting sources of
information has always been, and still remains today, of primal importance for the development of reliable modern information systems
involving artificial reasoning. In this chapter, we present a survey of our recent theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning, known
as Dezert-Smarandache Theory (DSmT) in the literature, developed for dealing with imprecise, uncertain and paradoxical sources of
information. We focus our presentation here rather on the foundations of DSmT, and on the two important new rules of combination,
than on browsing specific applications of DSmT available in literature. Several simple examples are given throughout the presentation
to show the efficiency and the generality of this new approach. The last part of this chapter concerns the presentation of the neutrosophic
logic, the neutro-fuzzy inference and its connection with DSmT. Fuzzy logic and neutrosophic logic are useful tools in decision making
after fusioning the information using the DSm hybrid rule of combination of masses.
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1 Introduction
The management and combination of uncertain, imprecise, fuzzy and even paradoxical or high conflicting sources of
information has always been, and still remains today, of primal importance for the development of reliable modern infor-
mation systems involving artificial reasoning. The combination (fusion) of information arises in many fields of applica-
tions nowadays (especially in defense, medicine, finance, geo-science, economy, etc). When several sensors, observers
or experts have to be combined together to solve a problem, or if one wants to update our current estimation of solutions
for a given problem with some new information available, we need powerful and solid mathematical tools for the fusion,
specially when the information one has to deal with is imprecise and uncertain. In this chapter, we present a survey of
our recent theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning, known as Dezert-Smarandache Theory (DSmT) in the literature,
developed for dealing with imprecise, uncertain and paradoxical sources of information. Recent publications have shown
the interest and the ability of DSmT to solve problems where other approaches fail, especially when conflict between
sources becomes high. We focus our presentation here rather on the foundations of DSmT, and on the two important new
rules of combination, than on browsing specific applications of DSmT available in literature. A particular attention is
given to general (hybrid) rule of combination which deals with any model for fusion problems, depending on the nature
of elements or hypotheses involved into them. The Shafer’s model on which is based the Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST)
appears only as a specific DSm hybrid model and can be easily handled by our approach as well. Several simple examples
are given throughout the presentation to show the efficiency and the generality of this new approach. The last part of
this work concerns the presentation of the neutrosophic logic, the neutro-fuzzy inference and its connection with DSmT.
Fuzzy logic and neutrosophic logic are useful tools in decision making after fusioning the information using the DSm
hybrid rule of combination of masses.
2 Foundations of the DSmT
The development of the DSmT (Dezert-Smarandache Theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning [37]) arises from the
necessity to overcome the inherent limitations of the DST (Dempster-Shafer Theory [31]) which are closely related with
the acceptance of Shafer’s model for the fusion problem under consideration (i.e. the frame of discernment Θ defined as
a finite set of exhaustive and exclusive hypotheses θi, i = 1, . . . , n), the third middle excluded principle (i.e. the existence
of the complement for any elements/propositions belonging to the power set of Θ), and the acceptance of Dempter’s
rule of combination (involving normalization) as the framework for the combination of independent sources of evidence.
Discussions on limitations of DST and presentation of some alternative rules to the Dempster’s rule of combination can
be found in [50, 51, 52, 46, 53, 17, 47, 28, 39, 43, 20, 27, 22, 30, 23, 37] and therefore they will be not reported in details
in this chapter due to space limitation. We argue that these three fundamental conditions of the DST can be removed and
another new mathematical approach for combination of evidence is possible.
The basis of the DSmT is the refutation of the principle of the third excluded middle and Shafer’s model, since for
a wide class of fusion problems the intrinsic nature of hypotheses can be only vague and imprecise in such a way that
precise refinement is just impossible to obtain in reality so that the exclusive elements θi cannot be properly identified
and precisely separated. Many problems involving fuzzy continuous and relative concepts described in natural language
and having no absolute interpretation like tallness/smallness, pleasure/pain, cold/hot, Sorites paradoxes, etc, enter in this
category. DSmT starts with the notion of free DSm model, denoted Mf (Θ), and considers Θ only as a frame of exhaus-
tive elements θi, i = 1, . . . , n which can potentially overlap. This model is free because no other assumption is done
on the hypotheses, but the weak exhaustivity constraint which can always been satisfied according the closure principle
explained in [37]. No other constraint is involved in the free DSm model. When the free DSm model holds, the classic
commutative and associative DSm rule of combination (corresponding to the conjunctive consensus defined on the free
Dedekind’s lattice) is performed.
Depending on the intrinsic nature of the elements of the fusion problem under consideration, it can however happen
that the free model does not fit the reality because some subsets of Θ can contain elements known to be truly exclusive
but also truly non existing at all at a given time (specially when working on dynamic fusion problem where the frame Θ
varies with time with the revision of the knowledge available). These integrity constraints are then explicitly and formally
introduced into the free DSm model Mf(Θ) in order to adapt it properly to fit as close as possible with the reality and
permit to construct a hybrid DSm model M(Θ) on which the combination will be efficiently performed. Shafer’s model,
denoted M0(Θ), corresponds to a very specific hybrid DSm model including all possible exclusivity constraints. The
DST has been developed for working only with M0(Θ) while the DSmT has been developed for working with any kind
of hybrid model (including Shafer’s model and the free DSm model), to manage as efficiently and precisely as possible
imprecise, uncertain and potentially high conflicting sources of evidence while keeping in mind the possible dynamicity
of the information fusion problematic. The foundations of the DSmT are therefore totally different from those of all
existing approaches managing uncertainties, imprecisions and conflicts. DSmT provides a new interesting way to attack
the information fusion problematic with a general framework in order to cover a wide variety of problems.
DSmT refutes also the idea that sources of evidence provide their beliefs with the same absolute interpretation of
elements of the same frame Θ and the conflict between sources arises not only because of the possible unreliabilty of
sources, but also because of possible different and relative interpretation of Θ, e.g. what is considered as good for
somebody can be considered as bad for somebody else. There is some unavoidable subjectivity in the belief assignments
provided by the sources of evidence, otherwise it would mean that all bodies of evidence have a same objective and
universal interpretation (or measure) of the phenomena under consideration, which unfortunately rarely occurs in reality,
but when bba are based on some objective probabilities transformations. But in this last case, probability theory can handle
properly and efficiently the information, and the DST, as well as the DSmT, becomes useless. If we now get out of the
probabilistic background argumentation for the construction of bba, we claim that in most of cases, the sources of evidence
provide their beliefs about elements of the frame of the fusion problem only based on their own limited knowledge and
experience without reference to the (inaccessible) absolute truth of the space of possibilities. First applications of DSmT
for target tracking, satellite surveillance, situation analysis and sensor allocation optimization can be found in [37].
2.1 Notion of hyper-power set DΘ
One of the cornerstones of the DSmT is the free Dedekind lattice [14] denoted hyper-power set in the DSmT framework.
Let Θ = {θ1, . . . , θn} be a finite set (called frame) of n exhaustive elements1. The hyper-power set DΘ is defined as the
set of all composite propositions built from elements of Θ with ∪ and ∩ operators2 such that:
1. ∅, θ1, . . . , θn ∈ DΘ.
2. If A,B ∈ DΘ, then A ∩B ∈ DΘ and A ∪B ∈ DΘ.
1We do not assume here that elements θi are necessary exclusive. There is no restriction on θi but the exhaustivity.
2Θ generates DΘ under operators ∪ and
3. No other elements belong to DΘ, except those obtained by using rules 1 or 2.
The dual (obtained by switching ∪ and ∩ in expressions) of DΘ is itself. There are elements in DΘ which are self-dual
(dual to themselves), for example α8 for the case when n = 3 in the following example. The cardinality of DΘ is ma-
jored by 22n when the cardinality of Θ equals n, i.e. |Θ| = n. The generation of hyper-power set DΘ is closely related
with the famous Dedekind problem [14, 13] on enumerating the set of isotone Boolean functions. The generation of the
hyper-power set is presented in [37]. Since for any given finite set Θ, |DΘ| ≥ |2Θ| we call DΘ the hyper-power set of Θ.
Example of the first hyper-power sets DΘ
• For the degenerate case (n = 0) where Θ = {}, one has DΘ = {α0 , ∅} and |DΘ| = 1.
• When Θ = {θ1}, one has DΘ = {α0 , ∅, α1 , θ1} and |DΘ| = 2.
• When Θ = {θ1, θ2}, one has DΘ = {α0, α1, . . . , α4} and |DΘ| = 5 with α0 , ∅, α1 , θ1 ∩ θ2, α2 , θ1, α3 , θ2
and α4 , θ1 ∪ θ2.
• When Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}, one has DΘ = {α0, α1, . . . , α18} and |DΘ| = 19 with
α0 , ∅
α1 , θ1 ∩ θ2 ∩ θ3 α10 , θ2
α2 , θ1 ∩ θ2 α11 , θ3
α3 , θ1 ∩ θ3 α12 , (θ1 ∩ θ2) ∪ θ3
α4 , θ2 ∩ θ3 α13 , (θ1 ∩ θ3) ∪ θ2
α5 , (θ1 ∪ θ2) ∩ θ3 α14 , (θ2 ∩ θ3) ∪ θ1
α6 , (θ1 ∪ θ3) ∩ θ2 α15 , θ1 ∪ θ2
α7 , (θ2 ∪ θ3) ∩ θ1 α16 , θ1 ∪ θ3
α8 , (θ1 ∩ θ2) ∪ (θ1 ∩ θ3) ∪ (θ2 ∩ θ3) α17 , θ2 ∪ θ3
α9 , θ1 α18 , θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3
The cardinality of hyper-power set DΘ for n ≥ 1 follows the sequence of Dedekind’s numbers [32], i.e. 1,2,5,19,167,
7580,7828353,... and analytical expression of Dedekind’s numbers has been obtained recently by Tombak in [42] (see
[37] for details on generation and ordering of DΘ).
2.2 Notion of free and hybrid DSm models
Elements θi, i = 1, . . . , n of Θ constitute the finite set of hypotheses/concepts characterizing the fusion problem under
consideration. DΘ constitutes what we call the free DSm model Mf (Θ) and allows to work with fuzzy concepts which
depict a continuous and relative intrinsic nature. Such kinds of concepts cannot be precisely refined in an absolute inter-
pretation because of the unapproachable universal truth.
However for some particular fusion problems involving discrete concepts, elements θi are truly exclusive. In such
case, all the exclusivity constraints on θi, i = 1, . . . , n have to be included in the previous model to characterize properly
the true nature of the fusion problem and to fit it with the reality. By doing this, the hyper-power set DΘ reduces naturally
to the classical power set 2Θ and this constitutes the most restricted hybrid DSm model, denotedM0(Θ), coinciding with
Shafer’s model. As an exemple, let’s consider the 2D problem where Θ = {θ1, θ2} with DΘ = {∅, θ1∩θ2, θ1, θ2, θ1∪θ2}
and assume now that θ1 and θ2 are truly exclusive (i.e. Shafer’s model M0 holds), then because θ1 ∩ θ2 M
0
= ∅, one gets
DΘ = {∅, θ1 ∩ θ2
M0
= ∅, θ1, θ2, θ1 ∪ θ2} = {∅, θ1, θ2, θ1 ∪ θ2} ≡ 2Θ.
Between the class of fusion problems corresponding to the free DSm model Mf(Θ) and the class of fusion problems
corresponding to Shafer’s model M0(Θ), there exists another wide class of hybrid fusion problems involving in Θ both
fuzzy continuous concepts and discrete hypotheses. In such (hybrid) class, some exclusivity constraints and possibly some
non-existential constraints (especially when working on dynamic3 fusion) have to be taken into account. Each hybrid
fusion problem of this class will then be characterized by a proper hybrid DSm modelM(Θ) with M(Θ) 6=Mf (Θ) and
M(Θ) 6=M0(Θ). As simple example of DSm hybrid model, let’s consider the 3D case with the frame Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}
with the modelM 6=Mf in which we force all possible conjunctions to be empty, but θ1∩θ2. This hybrid DSm model is
then represented with the following Venn diagram (where boundaries of intersection of θ1 and θ2 are not precisely defined
if θ1 and θ2 represent only fuzzy concepts like smallness and tallness by example).
3i.e. when the frame Θ and/or the modelM is changing with time.
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2.3 Generalized belief functions
From a general frame Θ, we define a map m(.) : DΘ → [0, 1] associated to a given body of evidence B as
m(∅) = 0 and
∑
A∈DΘ
m(A) = 1 (1)
The quantity m(A) is called the generalized basic belief assignment/mass (gbba) of A.
The generalized belief and plausibility functions are defined in almost the same manner as within the DST, i.e.
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆A
B∈DΘ
m(B) Pl(A) =
∑
B∩A 6=∅
B∈DΘ
m(B) (2)
These definitions are compatible with the definitions of classical belief functions in the DST framework when DΘ
reduces to 2Θ for fusion problems where Shafer’s model M0(Θ) holds. We still have ∀A ∈ DΘ, Bel(A) ≤ Pl(A). Note
that when working with the free DSm model Mf (Θ), one has always Pl(A) = 1 ∀A 6= ∅ ∈ DΘ which is normal.
2.4 The classic DSm rule of combination
When the free DSm modelMf (Θ) holds for the fusion problem under consideration, the classic DSm rule of combination
mMf (Θ) ≡ m(.) , [m1⊕m2](.) of two independent4 sources of evidences B1 and B2 over the same frame Θ with belief
functions Bel1(.) and Bel2(.) associated with gbba m1(.) and m2(.) corresponds to the conjunctive consensus of the
sources. It is given by [37]:
∀C ∈ DΘ, mMf (Θ)(C) ≡ m(C) =
∑
A,B∈DΘ
A∩B=C
m1(A)m2(B) (3)
Since DΘ is closed under∪ and ∩ set operators, this new rule of combination guarantees thatm(.) is a proper general-
ized belief assignment, i.e. m(.) : DΘ → [0, 1]. This rule of combination is commutative and associative and can always
be used for the fusion of sources involving fuzzy concepts when free DSm model holds for the problem under considera-
tion. This rule can be directly and easily extended for the combination of k > 2 independent sources of evidence [37].
This classic DSm rule of combination looks very expensive in terms of computations and memory size due to the
huge number of elements in DΘ when the cardinality of Θ increases. This remark is however valid only if the cores (the
set of focal elements of gbba) K1(m1) and K2(m2) coincide with DΘ, i.e. when m1(A) > 0 and m2(A) > 0 for all
A 6= ∅ ∈ DΘ. Fortunately, it is important to note here that in most of the practical applications the sizes of K1(m1) and
K2(m2) are much smaller than |DΘ| because bodies of evidence generally allocate their basic belief assignments only
over a subset of the hyper-power set. This makes things easier for the implementation of the classic DSm rule (3). The
DSm rule is actually very easy to implement. It suffices for each focal element of K1(m1) to multiply it with the focal
elements of K2(m2) and then to pool all combinations which are equivalent under the algebra of sets.
While very costly in term on merory storage in the worst case (i.e. when all m(A) > 0, A ∈ DΘ or A ∈ 2Θref ), the
DSm rule however requires much smaller memory storage than for the DST working on the ultimate refinement 2Θref of
same initial frame Θ as shown in following table
4While independence is a difficult concept to define in all theories managing epistemic uncertainty, we follow here the interpretation
of Smets in [38] and [39], p. 285 and consider that two sources of evidence are independent (i.e distinct and noninteracting) if each
leaves one totally ignorant about the particular value the other will take.
|Θ| = n |DΘ| |2Θref | = 22
n−1
2 5 23 = 8
3 19 27 = 128
4 167 215 = 32768
5 7580 231 = 2147483648
However in most fusion applications only a small subset of elements of DΘ have a non null basic belief mass because
all the commitments are just usually impossible to assess precisely when the dimension of the problem increases. Thus, it
is not necessary to generate and keep in memory all elements of DΘ or 2Θref but only those which have a positive belief
mass. However there is a real technical challenge on how to manage efficiently all elements of the hyper-power set. This
problem is obviously much more difficult when trying to work on the refined frame of discernment 2Θref if one prefer
to apply Dempster-Shafer theory and use the Dempster’s rule of combination. It is important to keep in mind that the
ultimate refined frame consisting in exhaustive and exclusive finite set of refined hypotheses is just impossible to justify
and to define precisely for all problems dealing with fuzzy and ill-defined continuous concepts. A full discussion and
example on refinement can be found in [37].
2.5 The hybrid DSm rule of combination
When the free DSm model Mf (Θ) does not hold due to the true nature of the fusion problem under consideration
which requires to take into account some known integrity constraints, one has to work with a proper hybrid DSm model
M(Θ) 6=Mf (Θ). In such case, the hybrid DSm rule of combination based on the chosen hybrid DSm model M(Θ) for
k ≥ 2 independent sources of information is defined for all A ∈ DΘ as [37]:
mM(Θ)(A) , φ(A)
[
S1(A) + S2(A) + S3(A)
]
(4)
where φ(A) is the characteristic non-emptiness function of a set A, i.e. φ(A) = 1 if A /∈ ∅ and φ(A) = 0 otherwise,
where ∅ , {∅M, ∅}. ∅M is the set of all elements of DΘ which have been forced to be empty through the constraints of
the model M and ∅ is the classical/universal empty set. S1(A) ≡ mMf (θ)(A), S2(A), S3(A) are defined by
S1(A) ,
∑
X1,X2,...,Xk∈D
Θ
(X1∩X2∩...∩Xk)=A
k∏
i=1
mi(Xi) (5)
S2(A) ,
∑
X1,X2,...,Xk∈∅
[U=A]∨[(U∈∅)∧(A=It)]
k∏
i=1
mi(Xi) (6)
S3(A) ,
∑
X1,X2,...,Xk∈D
Θ
u(c(X1∩X2∩...∩Xk))=A
(X1∩X2∩...∩Xk)∈∅
k∏
i=1
mi(Xi) (7)
with U , u(X1)∪ u(X2)∪ . . .∪ u(Xk) where u(X) is the union of all θi that compose X , It , θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ . . .∪ θn is the
total ignorance, and c(X) is the canonical form5 of X , i.e. its simplest form (for example if X = (A∩B)∩ (A∪B ∪C),
c(X) = A ∩ B). S1(A) corresponds to the classic DSm rule for k independent sources based on the free DSm model
Mf (Θ); S2(A) represents the mass of all relatively and absolutely empty sets which is transferred to the total or relative
ignorances associated with non existential constraints (if any, like in some dynamic problems); S3(A) transfers the sum
of relatively empty sets directly onto the canonical disjunctive form of non-empty sets.
The hybrid DSm rule of combination generalizes the classic DSm rule of combination and is not equivalent to
Dempter’s rule. It works for any models (the free DSm model, Shafer’s model or any other hybrid models) when manip-
ulating precise generalized (or eventually classical) basic belief functions. An extension of this rule for the combination
of imprecise generalized (or eventually classical) basic belief functions is presented in next section.
Note that in DSmT framework it is also possible to deal directly with complements if necessary depending on the
problem under consideration and the information provided by the sources of evidence themselves. The first and simplest
way is to work on Shafer’s model when utimate refinement is possible. The second way is to deal with partially known
5The canonical form is introduced here in order to improve the original formula given in [37] for preserving the neutral impact of
the vacuous belief mass m(Θ) = 1 within complex hybrid models.
frame and introduce directly the complementary hypotheses into the frame itself. By example, if one knows only two
hypotheses θ1, θ2 and their complements θ¯1, θ¯2, then can choose Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ¯1, θ¯2}. In such case, we don’t necessarily
assume that θ¯1 = θ2 and θ¯2 = θ1 because θ¯1 and θ¯2 may include other unknown hypotheses we have no information
about (case of partial known frame). More generally, in DSmT framework, it is not necessary that the frame is built on
pure/simple (possibly vague) hypotheses θi as usually done in all theories managing uncertainty. The frame Θ can also
contain directly as elements conjunctions and/or disjunctions (or mixed propositions) and negations/complements of pure
hypotheses as well. The DSm rules also work in such non-classic frames because DSmT works on any distributive lattice
built from Θ anywhere Θ is defined.
2.6 Examples of combination rules
Here are some numerical examples on results obtained by DSm rules of combination. More examples can be found in
[37].
2.6.1 Example with Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4}
Let’s consider the frame of discernment Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4}, two independent experts, and the two following bbas
m1(θ1) = 0.6 m1(θ3) = 0.6 m2(θ2) = 0.6 m2(θ4) = 0.6
represented in terms of mass matrix
M =
[
0.6 0 0.4 0
0 0.2 0 0.8
]
• The Dempster’s rule can not be applied because: ∀1 ≤ j ≤ 4, one gets m(θj) = 0/0 (undefined!).
• But the classic DSm rule works because one obtains: m(θ1) = m(θ2) = m(θ3) = m(θ4) = 0, and m(θ1 ∩ θ2) =
0.12, m(θ1 ∩ θ4) = 0.48, m(θ2 ∩ θ3) = 0.08, m(θ3 ∩ θ4) = 0.32 (partial paradoxes/conflicts).
• Suppose now one finds out that all intersections are empty (Shafer’s model), then one applies the hybrid DSm rule
and one gets (index h stands here for hybrid rule): mh(θ1 ∪ θ2) = 0.12, mh(θ1 ∪ θ4) = 0.48, mh(θ2 ∪ θ3) = 0.08
and mh(θ3 ∪ θ4) = 0.32.
2.6.2 Generalization of Zadeh’s example with Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}
Let’s consider 0 < ǫ1, ǫ2 < 1 be two very tiny positive numbers (close to zero), the frame of discernment be Θ =
{θ1, θ2, θ3}, have two experts (independent sources of evidence s1 and s2) giving the belief masses
m1(θ1) = 1− ǫ1 m1(θ2) = 0 m1(θ3) = ǫ1
m2(θ1) = 0 m2(θ2) = 1− ǫ2 m2(θ3) = ǫ2
From now on, we prefer to use matrices to describe the masses, i.e.[
1− ǫ1 0 ǫ1
0 1− ǫ2 ǫ2
]
• Using Dempster’s rule of combination, one gets
m(θ3) =
(ǫ1ǫ2)
(1− ǫ1) · 0 + 0 · (1− ǫ2) + ǫ1ǫ2
= 1
which is absurd (or at least counter-intuitive). Note that whatever positive values for ǫ1, ǫ2 are, Dempster’s rule
of combination provides always the same result (one) which is abnormal. The only acceptable and correct result
obtained by Dempster’s rule is really obtained only in the trivial case when ǫ1 = ǫ2 = 1, i.e. when both sources
agree in θ3 with certainty which is obvious.
• Using the DSm rule of combination based on free-DSm model, one gets m(θ3) = ǫ1ǫ2, m(θ1 ∩ θ2) = (1− ǫ1)(1−
ǫ2), m(θ1∩θ3) = (1−ǫ1)ǫ2, m(θ2∩θ3) = (1−ǫ2)ǫ1 and the others are zero which appears more reliable/trustable.
• Going back to Shafer’s model and using the hybrid DSm rule of combination, one gets m(θ3) = ǫ1ǫ2, m(θ1∪θ2) =
(1− ǫ1)(1 − ǫ2), m(θ1 ∪ θ3) = (1 − ǫ1)ǫ2, m(θ2 ∪ θ3) = (1− ǫ2)ǫ1 and the others are zero.
Note that in the special case when ǫ1 = ǫ2 = 1/2, one has
m1(θ1) = 1/2 m1(θ2) = 0 m1(θ3) = 1/2 and m2(θ1) = 0 m2(θ2) = 1/2 m2(θ3) = 1/2
Dempster’s rule of combinations still yields m(θ3) = 1 while the hybrid DSm rule based on the same Shafer’s model
yields now m(θ3) = 1/4, m(θ1 ∪ θ2) = 1/4, m(θ1 ∪ θ3) = 1/4, m(θ2 ∪ θ3) = 1/4 which is normal.
2.6.3 Comparison with Smets, Yager and Dubois & Prade rules
We compare the results provided by DSmT rules and the main common rules of combination on the following very simple
numerical example where only 2 independent sources (a priori assumed equally reliable) are involved and providing their
belief initially on the 3D frame Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}. It is assumed in this example that Shafer’s model holds and thus the
belief assignments m1(.) and m2(.) do not commit belief to internal conflicting information. m1(.) and m2(.) are chosen
as follows:
m1(θ1) = 0.1 m1(θ2) = 0.4 m1(θ3) = 0.2 m1(θ1 ∪ θ2) = 0.1
m2(θ1) = 0.5 m2(θ2) = 0.1 m2(θ3) = 0.3 m2(θ1 ∪ θ2) = 0.1
These belief masses are usually represented in the form of a belief mass matrix M given by
M =
[
0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3
0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1
]
(8)
where index i for the rows corresponds to the index of the source no. i and the indexes j for columns of M correspond to
a given choice for enumerating the focal elements of all sources. In this particular example, index j = 1 corresponds to
θ1, j = 2 corresponds to θ2, j = 3 corresponds to θ3 and j = 4 corresponds to θ1 ∪ θ2.
Now let’s imagine that one finds out that θ3 is actually truly empty because some extra and certain knowledge on θ3 is
received by the fusion center. As example, θ1, θ2 and θ3 may correspond to three suspects (potential murders) in a police
investigation, m1(.) and m2(.) corresponds to two reports of independent witnesses, but it turns out that finally θ3 has
provided a strong alibi to the criminal police investigator once arrested by the policemen. This situation corresponds to
set up a hybrid model M with the constraint θ3
M
= ∅.
Let’s examine the result of the fusion in such situation obtained by the Smets’, Yager’s, Dubois & Prade’s and hybrid
DSm rules of combinations. First note that, based on the free DSm model, one would get by applying the classic DSm
rule (denoted here by index DSmc) the following fusion result
mDSmc(θ1) = 0.21 mDSmc(θ2) = 0.11 mDSmc(θ3) = 0.06 mDSmc(θ1 ∪ θ2) = 0.03
mDSmc(θ1 ∩ θ2) = 0.21 mDSmc(θ1 ∩ θ3) = 0.13 mDSmc(θ2 ∩ θ3) = 0.14
mDSmc(θ3 ∩ (θ1 ∪ θ2)) = 0.11
But because of the exclusivity constraints (imposed here by the use of Shafer’s model and by the non-existential
constraint θ3
M
= ∅), the total conflicting mass is actually given by
k12 = 0.06 + 0.21 + 0.13 + 0.14 + 0.11 = 0.65 (conflicting mass)
• If one applies Dempster’s rule [31] (denoted here by index DS), one gets:
mDS(∅) = 0
mDS(θ1) = 0.21/[1− k12] = 0.21/[1− 0.65] = 0.21/0.35 = 0.600000
mDS(θ2) = 0.11/[1− k12] = 0.11/[1− 0.65] = 0.11/0.35 = 0.314286
mDS(θ1 ∪ θ2) = 0.03/[1− k12] = 0.03/[1− 0.65] = 0.03/0.35 = 0.085714
• If one applies Smets’ rule [40, 41] (i.e. the non normalized version of Dempster’s rule with the conflicting mass
transferred onto the empty set), one gets:
mS(∅) = m(∅) = 0.65 (conflicting mass)
mS(θ1) = 0.21
mS(θ2) = 0.11
mS(θ1 ∪ θ2) = 0.03
• If one applies Yager’s rule [45, 46, 47], one gets:
mY (∅) = 0
mY (θ1) = 0.21
mY (θ2) = 0.11
mY (θ1 ∪ θ2) = 0.03 + k12 = 0.03 + 0.65 = 0.68
• If one applies Dubois & Prade’s rule [18], one gets because θ3 M= ∅ :
mDP (∅) = 0 (by definition of Dubois & Prade’s rule)
mDP (θ1) = [m1(θ1)m2(θ1) +m1(θ1)m2(θ1 ∪ θ2) +m2(θ1)m1(θ1 ∪ θ2)]
+ [m1(θ1)m2(θ3) +m2(θ1)m1(θ3)]
= [0.1 · 0.5 + 0.1 · 0.1 + 0.5 · 0.3] + [0.1 · 0.3 + 0.5 · 0.2] = 0.21 + 0.13 = 0.34
mDP (θ2) = [0.4 · 0.1 + 0.4 · 0.1 + 0.1 · 0.3] + [0.4 · 0.3 + 0.1 · 0.2] = 0.11 + 0.14 = 0.25
mDP (θ1 ∪ θ2) = [m1(θ1 ∪ θ2)m2(θ1 ∪ θ2)] + [m1(θ1 ∪ θ2)m2(θ3) +m2(θ1 ∪ θ2)m1(θ3)]
+ [m1(θ1)m2(θ2) +m2(θ1)m1(θ2)]
= [0.30.1] + [0.3 · 0.3 + 0.1 · 0.2] + [0.1 · 0.1 + 0.5 · 0.4] = [0.03] + [0.09 + 0.02] + [0.01 + 0.20]
= 0.03 + 0.11 + 0.21 = 0.35
Now if one adds up the masses, one gets 0 + 0.34 + 0.25 + 0.35 = 0.94 which is less than 1. Therefore Dubois
& Prade’s rule of combination does not work when a singleton, or an union of singletons, becomes empty (in a dy-
namic fusion problem). The products of such empty-element columns of the mass matrix M are lost; this problem
is fixed in DSmT by the sum S2(.) in (4) which transfers these products to the total or partial ignorances.
In this particular example, using the hybrid DSm rule, one transfers the product of the empty-element θ3 column,
m1(θ3)m2(θ3) = 0.2 · 0.3 = 0.06, to mDSmh(θ1 ∪ θ2), which becomes equal to 0.35 + 0.06 = 0.41.
2.7 Fusion of imprecise beliefs
In many fusion problems, it seems very difficult (if not impossible) to have precise sources of evidence generating precise
basic belief assignments (especially when belief functions are provided by human experts), and a more flexible plausible
and paradoxical theory supporting imprecise information becomes necessary. In the previous sections, we presented the
fusion of precise uncertain and conflicting/paradoxical generalized basic belief assignments (gbba) in the DSmT frame-
work. We mean here by precise gbba, basic belief functions/masses m(.) defined precisely on the hyper-power set DΘ
where each mass m(X), where X belongs to DΘ, is represented by only one real number belonging to [0, 1] such that∑
X∈DΘ m(X) = 1. In this section, we present the DSm fusion rule for dealing with admissible imprecise generalized
basic belief assignments mI(.) defined as real subunitary intervals of [0, 1], or even more general as real subunitary sets
[i.e. sets, not necessarily intervals]. An imprecise belief assignment mI(.) over DΘ is said admissible if and only if
there exists for every X ∈ DΘ at least one real number m(X) ∈ mI(X) such that
∑
X∈DΘ m(X) = 1. The idea to
work with imprecise belief structures represented by real subset intervals of [0, 1] is not new and has been investigated in
[21, 15, 16] and references therein. The proposed works available in the literature, upon our knowledge were limited only
to sub-unitary interval combination in the framework of Transferable Belief Model (TBM) developed by Smets [40, 41].
We extend the approach of Lamata & Moral and Denœux based on subunitary interval-valued masses to subunitary set-
valued masses; therefore the closed intervals used by Denœux to denote imprecise masses are generalized to any sets
included in [0,1], i.e. in our case these sets can be unions of (closed, open, or half-open/half-closed) intervals and/or
scalars all in [0, 1]. Here, the proposed extension is done in the context of the DSmT framework, although it can also ap-
ply directly to fusion of imprecise belief structures within TBM as well if the user prefers to adopt TBM rather than DSmT.
Before presenting the general formula for the combination of generalized imprecise belief structures, we remind the
following set operators involved in the formula. Several numerical examples are given in [37].
• Addition of sets
S1 ⊞ S2 = S2 ⊞ S1 , {x | x = s1 + s2, s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2} with
{
inf(S1 ⊞ S2) = inf(S1) + inf(S2)
sup(S1 ⊞ S2) = sup(S1) + sup(S2)
• Subtraction of sets
S1 ⊟ S2 , {x | x = s1 − s2, s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2} with
{
inf(S1 ⊟ S2) = inf(S1)− sup(S2)
sup(S1 ⊟ S2) = sup(S1)− inf(S2)
• Multiplication of sets
S1 ⊡ S2 , {x | x = s1 · s2, s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2} with
{
inf(S1 ⊡ S2) = inf(S1) · inf(S2)
sup(S1 ⊡ S2) = sup(S1) · sup(S2)
2.7.1 DSm rule of combination for imprecise beliefs
We present the generalization of the DSm rules to combine any type of imprecise belief assignment which may be repre-
sented by the union of several sub-unitary (half-) open intervals, (half-)closed intervals and/or sets of points belonging to
[0,1]. Several numerical examples are also given. In the sequel, one uses the notation (a, b) for an open interval, [a, b] for
a closed interval, and (a, b] or [a, b) for a half open and half closed interval. From the previous operators on sets, one can
generalize the DSm rules (classic and hybrid) from scalars to sets in the following way [37] (chap. 6): ∀A 6= ∅ ∈ DΘ,
mI(A) =
∑
X1,X2,...,Xk∈DΘ
(X1∩X2∩...∩Xk)=A
∏
i=1,...,k
mIi (Xi) (9)
where
∑
and
∏
represent the summation, and respectively product, of sets.
Similarly, one can generalize the hybrid DSm rule from scalars to sets in the following way:
mIM(Θ)(A) , φ(A)⊡
[
SI1(A) ⊞ S
I
2(A) ⊞ S
I
3 (A)
]
(10)
φ(A) is the characteristic non emptiness function of the set A and SI1 (A), SI2(A) and SI3(A) are defined by
SI1 (A) ,
∑
X1,X2,...,Xk∈DΘ
(X1∩X2∩...∩Xk)=A
∏
i=1,...,k
mIi (Xi) (11)
SI2(A) ,
∑
X1,X2,...,Xk∈∅
[U=A]∨[(U∈∅)∧(A=It)]
∏
i=1,...,k
mIi (Xi) (12)
SI3 (A) ,
∑
X1,X2,...,Xk∈DΘ
(X1∪X2∪...∪Xk)=A
(X1∩X2∩...∩Xk)∈∅
∏
i=1,...,k
mIi (Xi) (13)
In the case when all sets are reduced to points (numbers), the set operations become normal operations with numbers;
the sets operations are generalizations of numerical operations. When imprecise belief structures reduce to precise belief
structure, DSm rules (9) and (10) reduce to their precise version (3) and (4) respectively.
2.7.2 Example
Here is a simple example of fusion with with multiple-interval masses. For simplicity, this example is a particular case
when the theorem of admissibility (see [37] p. 138 for details) is verified by a few points, which happen to be just on
the bounders. It is an extreme example, because we tried to comprise all kinds of possibilities which may occur in the
imprecise or very imprecise fusion. So, let’s consider a fusion problem over Θ = {θ1, θ2}, two independent sources of
information with the following imprecise admissible belief assignments
A ∈ DΘ mI1(A) m
I
2(A)
θ1 [0.1, 0.2]∪ {0.3} [0.4, 0.5]
θ2 (0.4, 0.6) ∪ [0.7, 0.8] [0, 0.4] ∪ {0.5, 0.6}
Table 1: Inputs of the fusion with imprecise bba
Using the DSm classic rule for sets, one gets
mI(θ1) = ([0.1, 0.2] ∪ {0.3})⊡ [0.4, 0.5] = ([0.1, 0.2]⊡ [0.4, 0.5])∪ ({0.3}⊡ [0.4, 0.5]) = [0.04, 0.10]∪ [0.12, 0.15]
mI(θ2) = ((0.4, 0.6) ∪ [0.7, 0.8])⊡ ([0, 0.4] ∪ {0.5, 0.6})
= ((0.4, 0.6)⊡ [0, 0.4]) ∪ ((0.4, 0.6)⊡ {0.5, 0.6})∪ ([0.7, 0.8]⊡ [0, 0.4]) ∪ ([0.7, 0.8]⊡ {0.5, 0.6})
= (0, 0.24) ∪ (0.20, 0.30)∪ (0.24, 0.36)∪ [0, 0.32]∪ [0.35, 0.40]∪ [0.42, 0.48] = [0, 0.40] ∪ [0.42, 0.48]
mI(θ1 ∩ θ2) = [([0.1, 0.2] ∪ {0.3})⊡ ([0, 0.4] ∪ {0.5, 0.6})]⊞ [[0.4, 0.5]⊡ ((0.4, 0.6) ∪ [0.7, 0.8])]
= [([0.1, 0.2]⊡ [0, 0.4]) ∪ ([0.1, 0.2]⊡ {0.5, 0.6})∪ ({0.3}⊡ [0, 0.4]) ∪ ({0.3}⊡ {0.5, 0.6})]
⊞ [([0.4, 0.5]⊡ (0.4, 0.6)) ∪ ([0.4, 0.5]⊡ [0.7, 0.8])]
= [[0, 0.08]∪ [0.05, 0.10]∪ [0.06, 0.12]∪ [0, 0.12] ∪ {0.15, 0.18}]⊞ [(0.16, 0.30)∪ [0.28, 0.40]]
= [[0, 0.12]∪ {0.15, 0.18}]⊞ (0.16, 0.40] = (0.16, 0.52]∪ (0.31, 0.55]∪ (0.34, 0.58] = (0.16, 0.58]
Hence finally the fusion admissible result is given by:
A ∈ DΘ mI(A) = [mI1 ⊕m
I
2](A)
θ1 [0.04, 0.10]∪ [0.12, 0.15]
θ2 [0, 0.40] ∪ [0.42, 0.48]
θ1 ∩ θ2 (0.16, 0.58]
θ1 ∪ θ2 0
Table 2: Fusion result with the DSm classic rule
If one finds out6 that θ1 ∩ θ2
M
≡ ∅ (this is our hybrid modelM one wants to deal with), then one uses the hybrid DSm rule
for sets (10): mIM(θ1 ∩ θ2) = 0 and mIM(θ1 ∪ θ2) = (0.16, 0.58], the others imprecise masses are not changed. In other
words, one gets now with hybrid DSm rule applied to imprecise beliefs:
A ∈ DΘ mIM(A) = [m
I
1 ⊕m
I
2](A)
θ1 [0.04, 0.10]∪ [0.12, 0.15]
θ2 [0, 0.40]∪ [0.42, 0.48]
θ1 ∩ θ2
M
≡ ∅ 0
θ1 ∪ θ2 (0.16, 0.58]
Table 3: Fusion result with the hybrid DSm rule for M
Let’s check now the admissibility conditions and theorem. For the source 1, there exist the precise masses (m1(θ1) =
0.3) ∈ ([0.1, 0.2] ∪ {0.3}) and (m1(θ2) = 0.7) ∈ ((0.4, 0.6) ∪ [0.7, 0.8]) such that 0.3 + 0.7 = 1. For the source 2,
there exist the precise masses (m1(θ1) = 0.4) ∈ ([0.4, 0.5]) and (m2(θ2) = 0.6) ∈ ([0, 0.4] ∪ {0.5, 0.6}) such that
0.4 + 0.6 = 1. Therefore both sources associated with mI1(.) and mI2(.) are admissible imprecise sources of information.
It can be easily checked that the DSm classic fusion of m1(.) and m2(.) yields the paradoxical basic belief assignment
m(θ1) = [m1 ⊕ m2](θ1) = 0.12, m(θ2) = [m1 ⊕ m2](θ2) = 0.42 and m(θ1 ∩ θ2) = [m1 ⊕ m2](θ1 ∩ θ2) = 0.46.
One sees that the admissibility theorem is satisfied since (m(θ1) = 0.12) ∈ (mI(θ1) = [0.04, 0.10] ∪ [0.12, 0.15]),
(m(θ2) = 0.42) ∈ (mI(θ2) = [0, 0.40] ∪ [0.42, 0.48]) and (m(θ1 ∩ θ2) = 0.46) ∈ (mI(θ1 ∩ θ2) = (0.16, 0.58]) such
that 0.12 + 0.42 + 0.46 = 1. Similarly if one finds out that θ1 ∩ θ2 = ∅, then one uses the hybrid DSm rule and one gets:
m(θ1 ∩ θ2) = 0 and m(θ1 ∪ θ2) = 0.46; the others remain unchanged. The admissibility theorem still holds, because
one can pick at least one number in each subset mI(.) such that the sum of these numbers is 1. This approach can be also
used in the similar manner to obtain imprecise pignistic probabilities from mI(.) for decision-making under uncertain,
paradoxical and imprecise sources of information as well. The generalized pignistic transformation (GPT) is presented in
next section.
2.8 The generalized pignistic transformation (GPT)
2.8.1 The classical pignistic transformation
We follow here the Smets’ vision which considers the management of information as a two 2-levels process: credal (for
combination of evidences) and pignistic7 (for decision-making) , i.e ”when someone must take a decision, he must then
construct a probability function derived from the belief function that describes his credal state. This probability function is
then used to make decisions” [39] (p. 284). One obvious way to build this probability function corresponds to the so-called
Classical Pignistic Transformation (CPT) defined in the DST framework (i.e. based on the Shafer’s model assumption) as
[41]:
P{A} =
∑
X∈2Θ
|X ∩ A|
|X |
m(X) (14)
6We consider now a dynamic fusion problem.
7Pignistic terminology has been coined by Philippe Smets and comes from pignus, a bet in Latin.
where |A| denotes the number of worlds in the setA (with convention |∅|/|∅| = 1, to define P{∅}). P{A} corresponds
to BetP (A) in Smets’ notation [41]. Decisions are achieved by computing the expected utilities of the acts using the
subjective/pignistic P{.} as the probability function needed to compute expectations. Usually, one uses the maximum
of the pignistic probability as decision criterion. The max. of P{.} is often considered as a prudent betting decision
criterion between the two other alternatives (max of plausibility or max. of credibility which appears to be respectively
too optimistic or too pessimistic). It is easy to show that P{.} is indeed a probability function (see [40]).
2.8.2 Notion of DSm cardinality
One important notion involved in the definition of the Generalized Pignistic Transformation (GPT) is the DSm cardinality.
The DSm cardinality of any element A of hyper-power set DΘ, denoted CM(A), corresponds to the number of parts of
A in the corresponding fuzzy/vague Venn diagram of the problem (model M) taking into account the set of integrity
constraints (if any), i.e. all the possible intersections due to the nature of the elements θi. This intrinsic cardinality
depends on the model M (free, hybrid or Shafer’s model). M is the model that contains A, which depends both on the
dimension n = |Θ| and on the number of non-empty intersections present in its associated Venn diagram (see [37] for
details ). The DSm cardinality depends on the cardinal of Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θn} and on the model of DΘ (i.e., the number
of intersections and between what elements of Θ - in a word the structure) at the same time; it is not necessarily that
every singleton, say θi, has the same DSm cardinal, because each singleton has a different structure; if its structure is
the simplest (no intersection of this elements with other elements) then CM(θi) = 1, if the structure is more complicated
(many intersections) then CM(θi) > 1; let’s consider a singleton θi: if it has 1 intersection only then CM(θi) = 2, for 2
intersections only CM(θi) is 3 or 4 depending on the modelM, for m intersections it is between m+1 and 2m depending
on the model; the maximum DSm cardinality is 2n−1 and occurs for θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ . . . ∪ θn in the free model Mf ; similarly
for any set from DΘ: the more complicated structure it has, the bigger is the DSm cardinal; thus the DSm cardinality
measures the complexity of en element from DΘ, which is a nice characterization in our opinion; we may say that for
the singleton θi not even |Θ| counts, but only its structure (= how many other singletons intersect θi). Simple illustrative
examples are given in Chapter 3 and 7 of [37]. One has 1 ≤ CM(A) ≤ 2n − 1. CM(A) must not be confused with the
classical cardinality |A| of a given set A (i.e. the number of its distinct elements) - that’s why a new notation is necessary
here. CM(A) is very easy to compute by programming from the algorithm of generation of DΘ given explicated in [37].
As example, let’s take back the example of the simple hybrid DSm model described in section 2.2, then one gets the
following list of elements (with their DSm cardinal) for the restricted DΘ taking into account the integrity constraints of
this hybrid model:
A ∈ DΘ CM(A)
α0 , ∅ 0
α1 , θ1 ∩ θ2 1
α2 , θ3 1
α3 , θ1 2
α4 , θ2 2
α5 , θ1 ∪ θ2 3
α6 , θ1 ∪ θ3 3
α7 , θ2 ∪ θ3 3
α8 , θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 4
Eaxmple of DSm cardinals: CM(A) for hybrid model M
2.8.3 The Generalized Pignistic Transformation
To take a rational decision within the DSmT framework, it is necessary to generalize the Classical Pignistic Transformation
in order to construct a pignistic probability function from any generalized basic belief assignment m(.) drawn from the
DSm rules of combination. Here is the simplest and direct extension of the CPT to define the Generalized Pignistic
Transformation:
∀A ∈ DΘ, P{A} =
∑
X∈DΘ
CM(X ∩ A)
CM(X)
m(X) (15)
where CM(X) denotes the DSm cardinal of proposition X for the DSm model M of the problem under consideration.
The decision about the solution of the problem is usually taken by the maximum of pignistic probability function
P{.}. Let’s remark the close ressemblance of the two pignistic transformations (14) and (15). It can be shown that (15)
reduces to (14) when the hyper-power set DΘ reduces to classical power set 2Θ if we adopt Shafer’s model. But (15)
is a generalization of (14) since it can be used for computing pignistic probabilities for any models (including Shafer’s
model). It has been proved in [37] (Chap. 7) that P{.} is indeed a probability function.
3 Fuzzy Inference for Information Fusion
We further connect the fusion rules of combination with fuzzy and neutrosophic operators. Lets first replace the Con-
junctive Rule and Disjunctive Rule with the fuzzy T-norm and T-conorm versions respectively. These rules started from
the T-norm and T-conorm respectively in fuzzy and neutrosophic logics, where the and logic operator ∧ corresponds in
fusion to the conjunctive rule, while the or logic operator ∨ corresponds to the disjunctive rule. While the logic operators
deal with degrees of truth and degrees of falsehood, the fusion rules deal with degrees of belief and degrees of disbelief
of hypotheses.
3.1 T-Norm
A T-norm is a function Tn : [0, 1]2 7→ [0, 1], defined in fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic to represent the intersection of two
fuzzy sets and the fuzzy logical operator and respectively. Extended to the fusion theory the T-norm will be a substitute
for the conjunctive rule. The T-norm satisfies the conditions:
a) Boundary Conditions: Tn(0, 0) = 0, Tn(x, 1) = x
b) Commutativity: Tn(x, y) = Tn(y, x)
c) Monotonicity: If x ≤ u and y ≤ v, then Tn(x, y) ≤ Tn(u, v)
d) Associativity: Tn(Tn(x, y), z) = Tn(x, Tn(y, z))
There are many functions which satisfy the T-norm conditions. We present below the most known ones:
• The Algebraic Product T-norm: Tn-algebraic(x, y) = x · y
• The Bounded T-norm: Tn-bounded(x, y) = max{0, x+ y − 1}
• The Default (min) T-norm (introduced by Zadeh): Tn-min(x, y) = min{x, y}
3.2 T-conorm
A T-conorm is a function Tc : [0, 1]2 7→ [0, 1], defined in fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic to represent the union of two
fuzzy sets and the fuzzy logical operator or respectively. Extended to the fusion theory the T-conorm will be a substitute
for the disjunctive rule. The T-conorm satisfies the conditions:
a) Boundary Conditions: Tc(1, 1) = 1, Tc(x, 0) = x
b) Commutativity: Tc(x, y) = Tc(y, x)
c) Monotonicity: if x ≤ u and y ≤ v, then Tc(x, y) ≤ Tc(u, v)
d) Associativity: Tc(Tc(x, y), z) = Tc(x, Tc(y, z))
There are many functions which satisfy the T-conorm conditions. We present below the most known ones:
• The Algebraic Product T-conorm: Tc-algebraic(x, y) = x+ y − x · y
• The Bounded T-conorm: Tc-bounded(x, y) = min{1, x+ y}
• The Default (max) T-conorm (introduced by Zadeh): Tc-max(x, y) = max{x, y}
Then, the T-norm Fusion rule is defined as follows: m∩12(A) =
∑
Y,Y ∈Θ
X∩Y=A
Tn(m1(X),m2(Y )) and the T-conorm
Fusion rule is defined as follows: m∪12(A) =
∑
Y,Y∈Θ
X∪Y=A
Tc(m1(X),m2(Y )).
The min T-norm rule yields results, very closed to Conjunctive Rule. It satisfies the principle of neutrality of the
vacuous bba, reflects the majority opinion, converges towards idempotence. It is simpler to apply, but needs normalization.
What is missed it is a strong justification of the way of presenting the fusion process. But we think, the consideration
between two sources of information as a vague relation, characterized with the particular way of association between focal
elements, and corresponding degree of association (interaction) between them is reasonable. Min rule can be interpreted
as an optimistic lower bound for combination of bba and the below Max rule as a prudent/pessimistic upper bound. The
T-norm and T-conorm are commutative, associative, isotone, and have a neutral element.
4 Degrees of intersection, union, inclusion
In order to improve many fusion rules we can insert a degree of intersection, a degree of union, or a degree of inclusion.
These are defined as follows:
4.1 Degree of Intersection
The degree of intersection measures the percentage of overlapping region of two sets X1, X2 with respect to the whole
reunited regions of the sets using the cardinal of sets not the fuzzy set point of view:
d(X1 ∩X2) =
|X1 ∩X2|
|X1 ∪X2|
where |X | means cardinal of the set X .
For the minimum intersection/overlapping, i.e. when X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, the degree of intersection is 0, while for the
maximum intersection/overlapping, i.e. when X1 = X2, the degree of intersection is 1.
4.2 Degree of Union
The degree of intersection measures the percentage of non-overlapping region of two sets X1, X2 with respect to the
whole reunited regions of the sets using the cardinal of sets not the fuzzy set point of view:
d(X1 ∪X2) =
|X1 ∪X2| − |X1 ∩X2|
|X1 ∪X2|
For the maximum non-overlapping, i.e. when X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, the degree of union is 1, while for the minimum non-
overlapping, i.e. when X1 = X2, the degree of union is 0. The sum of degrees of intersection and union is 1 since they
complement each other.
4.3 Degree of inclusion
The degree of inclusion measures the percentage of the included region X1 with respect to the includant region X2: Let
X1 ⊆ X2, then
d(X1 ⊆ X2) =
|X1|
|X2|
d(∅ ⊆ X2) = 0 because nothing (i.e. empty set) is included in X2, while d(X2 ⊆ X2) = 1 because X2 is fulfilled by
inclusion. By definition d(∅ ⊆ ∅) = 1. We can generalize the above degree for n ≥ 2 sets.
4.4 Improvements of belief and plausibility functions
Thus the Bel(.) and Pl(.) functions can incorporate in their formulas the above degrees of inclusion and intersection
respectively:
• Belief function improved: ∀A ∈ DΘ \ ∅,Beld(A) =
∑
X∈DΘ
X⊆A
|X|
|A|m(X)
• Plausibility function improved: ∀A ∈ DΘ \ ∅, Pld(A) =
∑
X∈DΘ
X∩A 6=∅
|X∩A|
|X∪A|m(X)
4.5 Improvements of fusion rules
• Disjunctive rule improved:
∀A ∈ DΘ \ ∅, m∪d(A) = k∪d ·
∑
X1,X2∈D
Θ
X1∪X2=A
|X1 ∪X2| − |X1 ∩X2|
|X1 ∪X2|
m1(X1)m2(X2)
where k∪d is a constant of normalization.
• Dezert-Smarandache classical rule improved:
∀A ∈ DΘ \ ∅, mDSmCd(A) = kDSmCd ·
∑
X1,X2∈D
Θ
X1∩X2=A
|X1 ∩X2|
|X1 ∪X2|
m1(X1)m2(X2)
where kDSmCd is a constant of normalization. This rule is similar with the Zhangs Center Combination rule [54]
extended on the Boolean algebra (Θ,∪,∩, C) and using another definition for the degree of intersection (here C
denotes the complement).
• Dezert-Smarandache hybrid rule improved:
∀A ∈ DΘ \ ∅, mDSmHd(A) = kDSmCd · {
∑
X1,X2∈D
Θ
X1∩X2=A
|X1 ∩X2|
|X1 ∪X2|
m1(X1)m2(X2)
+
∑
X1,X2∈∅
[U=A]∨[(U∈∅)∧(A=It)]
m1(X1)m2(X2) +
∑
X1,X2∈D
Θ
u(c(X1∩X2))=A
(X1∩X2)∈∅
|X1 ∪X2| − |X1 ∩X2|
|X1 ∪X2|
m1(X1)m2(X2)}
where kDSmHd is a constant of normalization.
5 Neutrosophic Inference for Information Fusion
Similarly to the fuzzy improvement of the fusion rules we can now consider the neutrosophic improvement of the fusion
rules of combination. Lets now replace the Conjunctive Rule and Disjunctive Rule with the neutrosophic N-norm and
N-conorm versions respectively [44].
5.1 Neutrosophy
Neutrosophic Logic, Neutrosophic Set, and Neutrosophic Probability started from Neutrosophy [33, 36, 34, 35]. Neu-
trosophy is a new branch of philosophy which studies the origin, nature, and scope of neutralities, as well as their in-
teractions with different ideational spectra. It is an extension of dialectics. Its fundamental theory is that every idea
< A > tends to be neutralized, diminished, balanced by < NonA > ideas (not only < AntiA > as Hegel asserted)
- as a state of equilibrium, where < NonA >= what is not < A >, < AntiA >= the opposite of < A >, and
< NeutA >= what is neither < A > nor < AntiA >.
5.2 Nonstandard analysis
5.2.1 Short introduction
Abraham Robinson developed the nonstandard analysis in sixties [29]. x is called infinitesimal if |x| < 1/n for any
positive n. A left monad is defined by (−a) = {a − x|x ∈ R⋆, x > 0 infinitesimal} = a − ǫ and a right monad by
(b+) = {b + x|x ∈ R⋆, x > 0 infinitesimal} = b + ǫ where ǫ > 0 is infinitesimal; a, b are called standard parts, ǫ is
called nonstandard part. A bimonad is defined as (−a+) = (−a) ∪ (a+).
5.2.2 Operations with nonstandard finite real numbers
−a ⋆ b =− (a ⋆ b) a ⋆ b+ = (a ⋆ b)+ −a ⋆ b+ =− (a ⋆ b)+
• the left monads absorb themselves: −a ⋆− b =− (a ⋆ b)
• the right monads absorb themselves: a+ ⋆ b+ = (a ⋆ b)+
where ⋆ operation can be addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and power. The operations with real standard or
non-standard subsets are defined according definitions given in section 2.7.
5.3 Neutrosophic logic
Lets consider the nonstandard unit interval ]−0, 1+[, with left and right borders vague, imprecise. Let T , I , F be standard
or nonstandard subsets of ]−0, 1+[. Then: Neutrosophic Logic (NL) is a logic in which each proposition is T% true, I%
indeterminate, and F% false, where:
−0 ≤ inf T + inf I + inf F ≤ supT + sup I + supF ≤ 3+
T , I , F are not necessary intervals, but any sets (discrete, continuous, open or closed or half-open/half-closed interval,
intersections or unions of the previous sets, etc.).
For example: proposition P is between 30-40% or 45-50% true, 20% indeterminate, and 60% or between 66-70%
false (according to various analyzers or parameters). NL is a generalization of Zadehs fuzzy logic (FL), especially of
Atanassovs intuitionistic fuzzy logic (IFL) [1, 2, 7], and other logics.
5.4 Differences between Neutrosophic Logic and Intuitionistic Fuzzy Logic
a) In NL there is no restriction on T , I , F , while in IFL the sum of components (or their superior limits) = 1; thus NL
can characterize the incomplete information (sum < 1), paraconsistent information (sum > 1).
b) NL can distinguish, in philosophy, between absolute truth [NL(absolute truth)= 1+] and relative truth [NL(relative
truth)= 1], while IFL cannot; absolute truth is truth in all possible worlds (Leibniz), relative truth is truth in at least
one world.
c) In NL the components can be nonstandard, in IFL they dont.
d) NL, like dialetheism [some contradictions are true], can deal with paradoxes, NL(paradox) = (1, I, 1), while IFL
cannot.
5.5 Neutrosophic Logic generalizes many logics
Let the components reduced to scalar numbers, t, i, f , with t+ i+ f = n; NL generalizes:
• the Boolean logic (for n = 1 and i = 0, with f , f either 0 or 1);
• the multi-valued logic, which supports the existence of many values between true and false - Lukasiewicz, 3 values
[24, 25]; Post, m values - (for n = 1, Ii = 0, 0 ≤ t, f ≤ 1);
• the intuitionistic logic, which supports incomplete theories, where A ∧ ¬A not always true, and ∃xP (x) needs an
algorithm constructing x [9, 10, 11, 12, 19] (for 0 < n < 1 and i = 0, 0 ≤ t, f ≤ 1);
• the fuzzy logic, which supports degrees of truth [48] (for n = 1 and i = 0, 0 ≤ t, f ≤ 1);
• the intuitionistic fuzzy logic, which supports degrees of truth and degrees of falsity while whats left is considered
indeterminacy [2] (for n = 1);
• the paraconsistent logic, which supports conflicting information, and anything follows from contradictions fails,
i.e. ¬A ∧ A ⊃ B fails; ¬A ∧ A is not always false (for n > 1 and i = 0, with both 0 < t, f < 1);
• the dialetheism, which says that some contradictions are true, ¬A ∧ A = true (for t = f = 1 and i = 0; some
paradoxes can be denoted this way too);
• the faillibilism, which says that uncertainty belongs to every proposition (for i > 0).
5.6 Neutrosophic Logic connectors
One notes the neutrosophic logical values of the propositions A1 and A2 by NL(A1) = (T1, I1, F1) and NL(A2) =
(T2, I2, F2). If, after calculations, in the below operations one obtains values < 0 or > 1, then one replaces them with −0
or 1+ respectively.
5.6.1 Negation
NL(¬A1) = ({1
+}⊟ T1, {1
+}⊟ I1, {1
+}⊟ F1)
5.6.2 Conjunction
NL(A1 ∧ A2) = (T1 ⊡ T2, I1 ⊡ I2, F1 ⊡ F2)
5.6.3 Weak or inclusive disjunction
NL(A1 ∨ A2) = (T1 ⊞ T2 ⊟ (T1 ⊡ T2), I1 ⊞ I2 ⊟ (I1 ⊡ I2), F1 ⊞ F2 ⊟ (F1 ⊡ F2))
Many properties of the classical logic operators do not apply in neutrosophic logic. Neutrosophic logic operators
(connectors) can be defined in many ways according to the needs of applications or of the problem solving.
5.7 Neutrosophic Set
LetU be a universe of discourse, M a set included in U . An element x fromU is noted with respect to the neutrosophic set
M as x(T, I, F ) and belongs to M in the following way: it is t% true in the set (degree of membership), i% indeterminate
(unknown if it is in the set) (degree of indeterminacy), and f% false (degree of non-membership), where t varies in T , i
varies in I , f varies in F . This definition is analogue to NL, and similarly NS generalizes the fuzzy set (FS), especially
the intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS), intuitionistic set (IS), paraconsistent set (PS) For example: x(50, 20, 40) ∈ A means:
with a belief of 50% x is in A, with a belief of 40% x is not in A, and the 20% is undecidable
5.7.1 Neutrosophic Set Operators
Let A1 and A2 be two sets over the universe U . An element x(T1, I1, F1) ∈ A1 and x(T2, I2, F2) ∈ A2 [neutrosophic
membership appurtenance to A1 and respectively to A2]. NS operators (similar to NL connectors) can also be defined in
many ways.
5.7.2 Complement
If x(T 1, I1, F1) ∈ A1 then x({1+}⊟ T1, {1+}⊟ I1, {1+}⊟ F1)) ∈ C(A1).
5.7.3 Intersection
If x(T1, I1, F1) ∈ A1 and x(T2, I2, F2) ∈ A2 then x(T1 ⊡ T2, I1 ⊡ I2, F1 ⊡ F2) ∈ A1 ∩ A2.
5.7.4 Union
If x(T1, I1, F1) ∈ A1 and x(T2, I2, F2) ∈ A2 then x(T1⊞T2⊟(T1⊡T2), I1⊞I2⊟(I1⊡I2), F1⊞F2⊟(F1⊡F2)) ∈ A1∪A2.
5.7.5 Difference
If x(T1, I1, F1) ∈ A1 and x(T2, I2, F2) ∈ A2 then x(T1 ⊟ (T1 ⊡ T2), I1 ⊟ (I1 ⊡ I2), F1 ⊟ (F1 ⊡ F2)) ∈ A1 \A2.
5.8 Differences between Neutrosophic Set and Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set
a) In NS there is no restriction on T , I , F , while in IFS the sum of components (or their superior limits) = 1; thus NL
can characterize the incomplete information (sum < 1), paraconsistent information (sum > 1).
b) NS can distinguish, in philosophy, between absolute membership [NS(absolute membership)= 1+] and relative
membership [NS(relativemembership)= 1], while IFS cannot; absolute membership is membership in all possible
worlds, relative membership is membership in at least one world.
c) In NS the components can be nonstandard, in IFS they dont.
d) NS, like dialetheism [some contradictions are true], can deal with paradoxes, NS(paradox element) = (1, I, 1),
while IFS cannot.
e) NS operators can be defined with respect to T , I , F while IFS operators are defined with respect to T and F only
f) I can be split in NS in more subcomponents (for example in Belnaps four-valued logic [8] indeterminacy is split
into uncertainty and contradiction), but in IFS it cannot.
5.9 N-norm
Here each element x and y has three components: x(t1, i1, f1), y(t2, i2, f2). We define :{
max{x, y} = (max{t1, t2},max{i1, i2},max{f1, f2})
min{x, y} = (min{t1, t2},min{i1, i2},min{f1, f2})
An N-norm is a function Nn : ([−0, 1+]⊡ [−0, 1+]⊡ [−0, 1+])
2
7→ [−0, 1+], defined in neutrosophic set theory and
neutrosophic logic to represent the intersection of two neutrosophic sets and the neutrosophic logical operator and respec-
tively. Extended to the fusion theory the N-norm will be a substitute for the conjunctive rule. The N-norm satisfies the
conditions:
a) Boundary Conditions: Nn(0, 0) = 0, Nn(x, 1) = x.
b) Commutativity: Nn(x, y) = Nn(y, x).
c) Monotonicity: If x ≤ u and y ≤ v, then Nn(x, y) ≤ Nn(u, v).
d) Associativity: Nn(Nn(x, y), z) = Nn(x,Nn(y, z)).
There are many functions which satisfy the N-norm conditions. We present below the most known ones:
• The Algebraic Product N-norm: Nn-algebraic(x, y) = x⊡ y
• The Bounded N-norm: Nn-bounded(x, y) = max{0, x⊞ y ⊟ 1}
• The Default (min) N-norm: Nn-min(x, y) = min{x, y}.
5.10 N-conorm
An N-conorm is a function, Nc : ([−0, 1+]⊡ [−0, 1+]⊡ [−0, 1+])
2
7→ [−0, 1+], defined in neutrosophic set theory and
neutrosophic logic to represent the union of two neutrosophic sets and the neutrosophic logical operator or respectively.
Extended to the fusion theory the N-conorm will be a substitute for the disjunctive rule. The N-conorm satisfies the
conditions:
a) Boundary Conditions: Nc(1, 1) = 1, Nc(x, 0) = x.
b) Commutativity: Nc(x, y) = Nc(y, x).
c) Monotonicity: if x ≤ u and y ≤ v, then Nc(x, y) ≤ Nc(u, v).
d) Associativity: Nc(Nc(x, y), z) = Nc(x,Nc(y, z)).
There are many functions which satisfy the N-conorm conditions. We present below the most known ones:
• The Algebraic Product N-conorm: Nc-algebraic(x, y) = x⊞ y ⊟ (x ⊡ y)
• The Bounded N-conorm: Nc-bounded(x, y) = min{1, x⊞ y}
• The Default (max) N-conorm: Nc-max(x, y) = max{x, y}.
Then, the N-norm Fusion rule and the N-conorm Fusion rule are defined as follows:
mNn12(A) =
∑
X,Y ∈Θ
Y ∩Y=A
Nn(m1(X),m2(Y )) mNc12(A) =
∑
X,Y ∈Θ
Y ∪Y=A
Nc(m1(X),m2(Y ))
6 Examples of N-norm and N-conorm Fusion rules
Suppose one has the frame of discernment Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3} and two sources S1 and S2 that provide respectively the
following information (triple masses): m1(θ1) = (0.6, 0.1, 0.3), i.e. S1 believes in θ1 with 60%, doesnt believe in θ1 with
30%, and is undecided about θ1 with 10%. Similarly, one considers also
m1(θ2) = (0.8, 0, 0.2) m2(θ1) = (0.5, 0.3, 0.2) m2(θ2) = (0.7, 0.2, 0.1)
Since one can have all kind of information (i.e. incomplete, paraconsistent, complete) the sum of an hypothesis
components may be < 1, > 1, or = 1. We can normalize the hypothesis components by dividing each component by the
sum of the components.
6.1 Both Sources are right
If we consider that both sources are right, then one uses the N-norm (lets take, as an example, the Algebraic Product) and
one gets8:
mNn12(θ1) = m1(θ1)⊡m2(θ1) = (0.6, 0.1, 0.3)⊡ (0.5, 0.3, 0.2)
= (0.6 · 0.5, 0.1 · 0.3, 0.3 · 0.2) = (0.30, 0.03, 0.06)
∼
≡ (0.769231, 0.076923, 0.153846)
mNn12(θ2) = m1(θ2)⊡m2(θ2) = (0.8, 0, 0.2)⊡ (0.7, 0.2, 0.1)
= (0.8 · 0.7, 0 · 0.2, 0.2 · 0.1) = (0.56, 0, 0.02)
∼
≡ (0.965517, 0, 034483)
mNn12(θ1 ∩ θ2) = [m1(θ1)⊡m2(θ2)]⊞ [m2(θ1)⊡m1(θ2)]
= [(0.6, 0.1, 0.3)⊡ (0.7, 0.2, 0.1)]⊞ [(0.8, 0, 0.2)⊡ (0.5, 0.3, 0.2)]
= (0.42, 0.02, 0.03)⊞ (0.40, 0, 0.04) = (0.82, 0.02, 0.07)
∼
≡ (0.901099, 0.021978, 0.076923)
If one finds out that θ1 ∩ θ2 = ∅, then one uses the DSm hybrid rule adjusted with the N-norm in order to transfer the
conflicting mass to mNn12(θ1 ∪ θ2) = (0.901099, 0.021978, 0.076923).
8where ∼≡ denotes equality after normalization
6.2 One Source is right and another one is not, but we dont know which one
We use the N-conorm (lets take, as an example, the Algebraic Product) and one gets:
mNc12(θ1) = m1(θ1)⊞m2(θ1)⊟ [m1(θ1)⊡m2(θ1)]
= (0.6, 0.1, 0.3)⊞ (0.5, 0.3, 0.2)⊟ [(0.6, 0.1, 0.3)⊡ (0.5, 0.3, 0.2)]
= (0.6 + 0.5− 0.6 · 0.5, 0.1 + 0.3− 0.1 · 0.3, 0.3 + 0.2− 0.3 · 0.2)
= (0.80, 0.37, 0.44)
∼
≡ (0.496894, 0.229814, 0.273292)
mNc12(θ2) = m1(θ2)⊞m2(θ2)⊟ [m1(θ2)⊡m2(θ2)]
= (0.8, 0, 0.2)⊞ (0.7, 0.2, 0.1)⊟ [(0.8, 0, 0.2)⊡ (0.7, 0.2, 0.1)]
= (0.8 + 0.7− 0.8 · 0.7, 0 + 0.2− 0 · 0.2, 0.2 + 0.1− 0.2 · 0.1)
= (0.94, 0.20, 0.28)
∼
≡ (0.661972, 0.140845, 0.197183)
mNc12(θ1 ∩ θ2) = [m1(θ1)⊞m2(θ2)⊟ (m1(θ1)⊡m2(θ2))]⊞ [m1(θ2)⊞m2(θ1)⊟ (m1(θ2)⊡m2(θ1))]
= [(0.6, 0.1, 0.3)⊞ (0.7, 0.2, 0.1)⊟ ((0.6, 0.1, 0.3)⊡ (0.7, 0.2, 0.1))]
⊞ [(0.8, 0, 0.2)⊞ (0.5, 0.3, 0.2)⊟ ((0.8, 0, 0.2)⊡ (0.5, 0.3, 0.2))]
= (0.88, 0.28, 0.37)⊞ (0.90, 0.30, 0.36)
= (1.78, 0.58, 0.73)
∼
≡ (0.576052, 0.187702, 0.236246).
7 Conclusion
A general presentation of foundation of DSmT and its connection with neutrosophic logic has been proposed in this
chapter. We proposed new rules of combination for uncertain, imprecise and highly conflicting sources of information.
Several applications of DSmT have been proposed recently in the literature and show the efficiency of this new approach
over classical rules based mainly on the Demspter’s rule in the DST framework. In the last past of this chapter, we
showed that the combination of paradoxical, uncertain and imprecise sources of information can also be done using
fuzzy and neutrosophic logics or sets together with DSmT and other fusion rules or theories. The T-norms/conorm and
N-norms/conorms help in redefining new fusion rules of combination or in improving the existing ones.
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